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EMINENT DOMAIN IN COLORADO
GILBERT GOLDSTEIN AND ABE L. HOFFMAN
of the Denver Bar

"Whatever may have been the ancient right of condemnation,
it has been restrained by constitutional limitations in the protection of individual rights. The power lies dormant in the state
until the legislature speaks . . . . The right to condemn private
property is therefore a creature of statute, pursuant to which it
must clearly appear either by express grant or by necessary implication." '
Thus spoke the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado in
its most recent utterance in the field of Eminent Domain. 2 This
statement brings into sharp contrast the right of the state and
its subdivisions to appropriate private property and the right of
the individual to be unmolested in the enjoyment of his property
until there has been a declaration of public necessity and a grant
of power by the legislature. It is obvious, then, that unless the
statutes clearly state (1) the purposes for which property may
be condemned; (2) whose property may be condemned, and by
whom; and (3) the procedure such condemnation should follow,
unavoidable litigation will result and, in fact, is taking place
concerning preliminary matters rather than the basic question of
the compensation to be paid.
This article will concern itself with an analysis of the provision of our Constitution and statutes on eminent domain, their
strength and weakness, and attempt to come to some conclusion
as to possible changes or amendments.
We may start with a fundamental proposition often stated
by our courts:
Both our state constitution and statutes protect the
individual in his vested rights and prohibit the taking
thereof for public or private use without condemnation
under proper proceedings and just compensation given
therefor.3 . . .
The provisions of our Constitution referred to which protect
these individual rights are embodied in Article II, Sections 14
and 15:
Private property shall not be taken for private use
unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways
of necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or
ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural,
mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for
public or private use, without just compensation. Such
'Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Colo. 337, 191 P. 101.
Potashnick v. Public Service Co., Colo. Bar Assn. Advance Sheet, July 19,
1952.

1 Stuart v. County Commissioners of Jefferson County, 25 Colo. App. 568,
575, 139 P. 577.
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compensation shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners, of not less than three freeholders, or by a jury,
when required by the owner of the property, in such
manner as may be prescribed by law, and until the same
shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner,
the property shall not be needlessly disturbed, or the
proprietary rights of the owner therein divested; and
whenever an attempt is made to take private property
for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.
These sections merely confirm the common law limitation concerning who may take private property and emphasizes the fact
that the use for which the property may be taken must be a public
use. Although in the exceptional cases listed in Section 14 there
is authority for taking of private property for private uses, the
right is narrowly confined. In Pine Martin Mining Co. v. Empire
Zinc Co.,' the Court stated:
Although the words "private use" occur in our constitution and statutes, it is obvious that they do not mean
a strictly private use, that is to say, one having no relation to the public interest. The fact that the constitution
permits private property to be taken for certain specified
uses is an implied declaration that such uses are so closely
connected with the public interest as to be at least quasipublic, or in a modified sense, affected with the public
interest ...
Section 15 declares that property may not be taken or damaged without proper compensation. It also sets out the methods
of determining the compensation, and provides that until this
compensation has been paid into the court, the property shall not
be needlessly disturbed. It also makes provision for a full judicial
determination on whether the purpose for which property is
proposed to be taken is a public use.
Though apparently expressed as clearly as possible, this constitutional provision has been involved in litigation in more than
50 cases reported by courts of review beginning with Denver v.
Bayer,5 and concluding with Potaschnick v. Public Service Co.6
Even before this article appears in print, additional opinions may
be handed down. Any word used in the constitutional provision
may be a source of controversy. For example, whole treatises could
be written on the meaning and implication of the words, or damaged, or upon the word, public, but such investigations are beyond
the scope of this article.
The provision, however, does by limitation recognize the
powers of the sovereign to condemn private property for public
' 90 Colo. 529, 537, 11 P. 2d 221.
17 Colo. 13, 2 P. 6.
1 Colorado Bar Assn. Advance Sheet, July 19, 1952.
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use 7 and is the basis for every such taking in Colorado.
Despite the clear delimitations on the power of Eminent
Domain set forth in the provisions just discussed, Article XV,
Section 8 of the Constitution states:
The right of eminent domain shall never be abridged
nor so construed as to prevent the general assembly from
taking the property and franchises of incorporated companies, and subjecting them to public use, the same as the
property of individuals; and the police power of the state
shall never be abridged or so construed as to permit corporations to conduct their business in such manner as to
infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general
well-being of the state.
Apparently the intent of this section is to prohibit forever a
public body from alienating in any way its authority to condemn
public utility corporations or their property.
Although this section has been quoted once 8 and cited twice "
in Colorado decisions, it apparently has never been interpreted by
our Supreme Court. It would seem to codify the common law
doctrine that: "The power of eminent domain is inalienable and
no legislature can bind itself or its successors not to exercise this
power when public necessity and convenience require it;" 10 and

to make clear that corporate properties, including special franchises, may be taken just as individual property.
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that under the Constitution any property may be condemned for public use, but that,
unless the legislature by statute outlines the extent of the power
and who may exercise it and in what manner, this power will
remain dormant in the state.
We shall now consider what statutory provisions have been
enacted in Colorado and how well they answer the needs of the
agency which takes and the owner of the property taken.
The statutory law of eminent domain legislation is compiled
mainly in Chapter 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., under the heading,
Eminent Domain, and Article 5, Chapter 163, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann.
entitled Right of Eminent Domain under the Towns and Cities
chapter. This, unfortunately, does not mean that such legislation
is not found in many other places in the statutes. On the contrary,
it seems to be found everywhere. Authority to exercise the right
of eminent domain by various state, city, quasi-public, or quasimunicipal corporations is found in Section 228, Chapter 41; Section 76, Chapter 57; Section 69, Chapter 73; Sections 3, 8, 39
and 70, Chapter 82; Section 96, Chapter 134; Sections 388, 444
and 478, Chapter 90; Section 189, Chapter 46; Sections 142 and
143, Chapter 138; Section 111, Chapter 143; Section 13, Chapter
'Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 217, 220.
Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493.
Denver Power Co. v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 30 Colo. 204, 69 P. 568; Fort
Collins v. Public Serv. Co., 69 Colo. 554, 135 P. 1332.
108 Am. Jur. 636, Sec. 7.

DICTA

Sept., 1952

138; all in 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann. and other places.
Apparently little or no study was made as to existing legislation when new statutes granting the right were passed. Conflicts thus may occur, as the following illustration will suggest:
Section 142, Chapter 138, states:
The district, when necessary for the purposes of this
article, shall have a dominant right of eminent domain
over the right of eminent domain of railroad, telegraph,
telephone, gas, water power and other companies and corporations, and over towns, cities and counties and other
public corporations.
Section 70, Chapter 82, states:
The purpose of condemnation for the rehabilitation
of an area hereunder is hereby declared to be for a
superior public use and property already devoted to one
public use may be condemned for the purposes of this
article. (S. L. '45, p. 622, Sec. 9, effective April 9, 1945.)
What happens when a rehabilitationarea meets a conservancy
district? Is this the irresistible force meeting the immovable obj ect?
So, too, throughout our statutes, we have the same question,
for the most part unanswered. How far does an agency whose
use of land is public in nature have the authority to condemn the
land of another public body already dedicated to one public use
for another irreconcilable public use? The answer should be in
the statutes, but, unfortunately, is not.
Article 5, Chapter 163, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., Towns and
Cities, is a special purpose statute granting powers to cities of
the first or second class for a restricted number of public uses,
such as roads, parks or public improvements. Although it differs
in many instances from the General Eminent Domain Act, there
is a major point of possible distinction which should be discussed.
Under the general act, if no portion of a person's property
is taken, he can receive no compensation for diminution in value
of his property by reason of the proposed project, but a neighbor
whose property is severed, may recover for the identical impairment to remainder which is denied in the first instance.
On the other hand, under the .provisions of the Towns and
Cities Act, Section 125, Chapter 163, damages are defined as follows:
The fair and actual cash market value of all property proposed to be taken for the improvement without
reference to the projected improvement, and
The fair, direct, and actual damages caused on account of said improvement to other property not taken
for the improvement.
and benefits are determined as follows:
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' . . by assessing against the owner or owners of
all real estate which will be specially benefited by the
proposed improvement the amounts of said benefit as
special assessments.
It appears to the authors that the damages allowed and benefits assessed under the Towns and Cities Act are quite different
from those referred to in the general statute, in that they contemplate all damages and all benefits to any property, whether or
not there is a partial taking. The question of whether the general
act is in accord with the Constitution does not appear to have
been passed upon. It is of some advantage to the condemning
agency to use the general act rather than the Towns and Cities
Act. Under the latter, the extent of damage and benefit can be
appraised only with difficulty, since it applies to property untouched but indirectly affected by a new improvement, be it park
or parking lot. But, if the condemnation is invoked under the
general act, the owner would not be chargeable for the benefits
received nor compensable for detriment suffered where no part
of his property is actually taken. Some revision of these inconsistent acts seems to be in order.
Although, as indicated, the provisions of Chapter 61 and
Chapter 163 vary in many respects, our Supreme Court has failed
in many instances to recognize this distinction. For instance, one
of the mileposts in our interpretation of the General Eminent
Domain Statute has been Lavelle v. Julesburg, 49 Colo. 290, decided in 1910. Yet, the case is cited as authority for Wassenich v.
Denver, 67 Colo. 456, which came up under an amendment of
1911 to the Towns and Cities Act. The provisions of the two statutes on the point involved, far from being identical, appear to be
contradictory. To illustrate further, Wassenich v. Denver supra,
is cited as authority in numerous cases arising under the general
act, although it purports to construe the widely different Towns
and Cities Act.
To comment briefly upon the General Eminent Domain Act,
we find first of all that it is not really one act with one procedure,
but is a compilation of at least four separate acts conferring power
in some cases on the same and in other cases on different condemning agencies through procedures that vary in substance as well
as in detail.
Sections 1-20 of Chapter 61 comprise the basis of the Eminent
Domain procedure in Colorado, being the procedure under which
perhaps more than 90 per cent of all condemnation actions have
been and are being brought. Historically, this is one of our oldest
existing laws, going back at least to the General Laws of 1877,
and codified in the 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann. with very little change
or amendment, as will be discussed later.
Sections 21 to 25, Chapter 61, comprise the procedure for
condemning land of the United States or the State of Colorado.
The procedure therein set forth is quite different from the
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other procedural portions of the general act (Sec. 1-20, Ch. 61)
or the Towns and Cities Act (Ch. 163), thereby adding to the
confusion. These sections are poorly drawn, without incorporation of definitions, leaving much to the judgment of the Court
without guidance. Fortunately, the act has been used so little
that the authors fail to find any reported case thereunder.
Sections 26-41, Chapter 61, were enacted by the legislature
in 1907, as a bill: Granting the exercise of the right of Eminent
Domain to Tunnel Transportation Companies, Pipe Line Transmission Companies, Electric Power Transmission Companies and
Aerial Tramway Companies. The act itself merely confers upon
these companies the power of Eminent Domain, but does not provide for the procedure. In Sec. 7 " of the act is found the following
clauses:
... and when the parties cannot agree upon
the amount of compensation . . . same shall be determined in manner as now provided by law for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain. (Italics supplied.)
We ask, do the words as now provided by law mean the law of
1907 as it was without amendment, the law in 1908 at the time
of the next revision of the statutes of Colorado, the law in 1921
at the time of the compilation of Colorado law, or does it mean
the procedure under Sections 1-20, Chapter 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann.
as it exists now or may be changed hereafter?
The 1907 legislature, not quite satisfied with the confusion
it had added to our law, authorized certain telegraph, telephone,
electric light, power and pipe line companies to use the eminent
domain act. 12 It gave such companies the right to acquire property
"as now provided by law for the exercise of the right of Eminent
Domain and in the manner as set forth in this act." Once again
the pertinent question is, "when is now?"
To add to the confusion, the legislature included provisions
in the second act of 1907 which were different from and contradictory to the general act (Sections 1-20). It included a special
provision on immediate possession of property during pendency
of action 13 which is different both in procedure and substance
than the provision in the general act. 14
The question of the constitutionality of this special provision
has never been determined (although many cases have been tried
under it in the past 45 years), and both its application and interpretation are still open to question. We mention one other incidental problem with respect to it. Sec. 39, Chap. 82, 1935 Colo.
Stat. Ann., Housing, purports to confer upon a Housing Authority
the right to use this special provision for condemnation. Can such
right be given where the title of the original act limited its use
to telephone, power, telegraph and like companies?
"Now
12Now
"Now
4 Now

Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

32, Chap. 61, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN.
42-49, Chap. 61, 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN.
47, Chap. 61, 1935 CoLo. STAT. ANN.
6, Chap. 61, 1935 CoLo. STAT. ANN.
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Secs. 50 and 61, Chap. 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., passed in
the 1901 session of the legislature, granted to telegraph, telephone,
heat, light, and power companies selling electrical energy, certain rights of eminent domain. The statute refers back to Sections
1-20 for its procedure.
But, Sec. 52, Chap. 61, supra, passed by the legislature in
the 1891 session already had granted certain rights of Eminent
Domain, including the right of companies to construct telegraph
lines and pipe lines.
Apparently there is some needless duplication, since even this
brief examination reveals that you may condemn rights-of-way
for telegraph lines under at least five different eminent domain
provisions. In fact, it is even possible that if a city were condemning land for a pipe line, the owner would be awarded a different amount of compensation if the city chose to proceed under
one statute (Chap. 163) than if the city chose to proceed under
any of the other of its various authorities.
But that is not all, because if the city has a Home Rule
Charter, under Article XX of the Constitution, it may proceed
under the Eminent Domain provisions of the Charter and ignore
all the other laws granting the same power. Charter provisions
may vary to such an extent that we will not undertake to discuss
them here, except to mention that Denver's Charter adopts the
general law on the assessment of benefits and payment of damages and overrides other public uses (1927 Compilation, Section
80), with special provisions for boulevards, sewers, viaducts and
fire and police stations.
Having clearly demonstrated that confusion exists in the statutory law of eminent domain, we would now like to analyze Secs.
1-20, Chap. 61, 1935 Colo. Stat. Ann., the procedural provisions
under which, as we have indicated, the bulk of all such condemnation actions are brought.
Because this was a special procedural statute, it was not affected by our new Rules of Civil Proceedure. As a result, an attorney who has the good fortune to represent a petitioner or a
respondent in such a case must learn a whole new set of rules
which hark back to the days of our Code with its not found I, returns, etc.
This procedure is so old that if a married woman owns property in her own right, her husband must be joined as a party with
her. 16 We trust that the League of Women Voters has not heard
of this.
A more patent defect in the procedure concerns the immediate
possession provision of the statute 17 under which, if proper conditions are present, a condemning authority, after filing its petition, may obtain immediate possession of the premises being condemned during the pendency of the action. For many years this
"Sec. 4, Chap. 61, supra.
Sec. 2, Chap. 61, supra.
Sec. 6, Chap. 61, svpra.
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was considered an ex parte procedure. Then came the thunderbolt
of Swift z7. Smith 1 in which our Supreme Court said:
An order for immediate possession does not necessarily involve title to the lands, but it does affect possession
so that the imperative requirement of the statute "shall
determine" would imply some notice to the one in actual
possesion with some opportunity afforded him to testify.
Just what do these words some notice mean? Do they mean a
telephone call; do they mean an actual personal service of a notice;
do they mean that every person in possession, including the minor
children, must be served; or do they mean that service on the
head of the family or a posting of the premises is sufficient? The
statute is so deficient in setting up the procedure for this immediate possession that it would require innumerable court cases to
delineate what could be simply explained by legislative act. If
the so-called procedural sections of the statute do not even set
forth the simplest formulae of procedure essential to due process
of law, we may as well be without them entirely.
Did you ever hear of a case in a court of record where the
defendant does not have to answer the complaint or petition? In
the condemnation procedure of our statute there is no provision
for answer. Thus, the case may come to trial without any indication as to the issues to be raised. In spite of the fact that no answer
is provided for, or necessary, 19 the act provides 20 that any party
may demand a jury of freeholders, "before the time for the deol
Qfnnei
f-enant to appear and answer." This and man'y like
confusion pervade our present eminent domain law.
Another peculiarity of condemnation law is that at the trial
the respondent has the burden of proof, and opens and closes his
case to the jury.
During the past five years, the authors, acting either for the
petitioner or for the respondents, have participated in over 300
condemnation actions. This participation has revealed to us the
confusion which exists in our present acts and the desperate need
for revision.
We hope that this article has either revealed this confusion
to you or confused you sufficiently so that you, as members of the
Bar, will participate in an attempt to draft and have passed a
new Eminent Domain Act in Colorado which will clearly, concisely state who may condemn property; for what purpose property may be condemned; what property may be condemned and
under what circumstances; and, how condemnation shall proceed.
We submit it is time to rework and codify the law of eminent
domain from start to finish.
We note that in this issue of Dicta there are two suggestions
of possible procedural changes. One indicates the method used
by the Federal Government in adopting a special Rule of Civil
11119 Colo. 126.
"Whitehead v. Denver, 13 Colo. App. 134, 136; 56 P. 913.
2 Sec. 7, Chap. 61, s&upra.
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Procedure dealing with the subject, and the other is an even more
simplified set of statutory or judicial rules suggested for Colorado.
We urge you to examine these and other changes which will be
suggested and lend your assistance in arriving at the best law,
both procedural and substantive, for the right to condemn private
property is a creature of statute, and such rights which deprive
people of their property without their consent for the good of the
public should be very clearly set forth.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION
OF PROPERTY
CLIFFORD C. CHITTIM
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Colorado.

The key to procedure in the Federal Courts in the condemnation of property under the power of eminent domain is Rule 71A,1
which became effective as an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure August 1, 1951. This rule sets up a specialized
procedure to meet the distinctive requirements of an eminent domain action, and integrates into the Federal Rules the procedure in
such actions. Except as otherwise provided in that rule, the rules
of civil procedure for the United States District Courts control.
The adoption of Rule 71A came in response to growing widespread dissatisfaction with the diverse procedures applied in condemnation suits in United States District Courts and the accompanying demand for some uniform procedure. The Advisory Committee on Rules, prior to its recommendation of the Rules of 1938,
and again when it was considering the amendments of 1946, had
given serious consideration to proposals to incorporate in the rules
one covering condemnation proceedings.2 The great number of condemnation suits filed by the United States during the war gave
added impetus to the demand for uniformity and some degree of
simplification in the rules. These procedural changes, it was argued, would make more effective both the exercise of the power of
eminent domain and the constitutional right of the property owner
to just compensation. Rule 71A brings condemnation proceedings
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; establishes, with one
exception, the same procedure in the various United States District
Courts; and, in an attempt to simplify the procedure, incorporates
several departures from the procedure more commonly followed in
the state courts and, prior to its adoption, in the federal courts.
The Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, were applicable
in condemnation cases only on appeals. In pre-appellate procedure,
a vast number of diversified procedures existed in the United States
District Courts. In some of the acts authorizing the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, Congress had prescribed, in varying
' United States Code, Title 28, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Ibid. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, following Rule 71A.
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degree, the procedure to be followed. Such procedures were by no
means uniform. In more numerous instances, the Congressional
act authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain failed
to specify the exact procedure to be followed. In the absence of
Congressional prescribed procedure, conformity, as near as may
be, to existing state practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings.
with its attending uncertainty and confusion, was required. 3 Rule
71A covers the condemnation of both real and personal property.
For the great bulk of condemnation cases, those invoking the national power of eminent domain, it provides procedure that is uniform in all the United States District Courts. In the limited number of cases involving the exercise of the state's power of eminent
domain, which reach the United States District Courts because of
diversity of citizenship, the same procedure, with a single exception, applies. Subdivision (k) of the rule provides that, in those
cases involving the exercise of the power of eminent domain under
the law of the state, any state law making provision for trial of any
issue by jury, or for the trial of the issue of compensation by jury
or commission or both, shall be followed.
The following paragraphs do not purport to go beyond a descriptive summary, the primary purpose of which is to present the
principal features of federal condemnation procedure, as distinguished from the procedure in other civil cases in the federal courts,
with a view to reflecting in that specialized procedure the principal
points of departure from condemnation procedure in courts of the
state of Colorado.
COMPLAINT

The caption, in addition to meeting the general requirements
of Rule 10(a), must name as defendants the property and at least
one of the defendants. Broad joinder, including properties acquired
for different uses, is authorized. Any defendant aggrieved by such
joinder may invoke the power of the court under Rule 21 to sever
and procede separately with any claim, and the court's wide discretion, under Rule 42(b), to order separate trials. The specified
contents of the complaint are a short and plain statement of (1)
the authority for the taking; (2) the use for which the property
is taken; (3) a description of the property; (4) the interests to be
acquired; and (5) identification, as to each piece of property, of
the defendants joined as owners or persons interested therein. At
the commencement of the action, only those persons having or claiming an interest in the property, whose names are then known, need
be joined as defendants, but prior to any hearing for the determination of compensation, the plaintiff must add as defendants,
All persons having or claiming an interest in that
property whose names can be ascertained by a reasonably
diligent search of the records, considering the character
and value of the property involved and the interests to be
'40 U. S. C. 258 (1940).
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acquired, and also those whose names have otherwise been
learned.
All others may be made defendants under the designation
"Unknown Owners."
Since service of the complaint with the notice is not required,
the plaintiff must furnish to the clerk at least one copy for the use
of the defendants. The necessity for frequent amendments to add
new parties or to embrace additional property or interests is recognized. Prior to the trial of the issue of compensation, the plaintiff
may amend the complaint, without leave of court, as many times as
desired, provided such amendment does not constitute a dismissal
prohibited by subdivision (i) of the rule. Any affected party, who
has not appeared, must be served with notice in the manner provided for service of process, and any affected party, who has appeared, must be served with notice of the filing of the amendment.
PROCESS

In place of a summons, the initial process is a notice. The
plaintiff is directed to deliver to the clerk, at the time of the filing
of the complaint, joint or several notices directed to the defendants
named in the complaint. The form of the notice is calculated to
advise the defendant of the claim asserted against him and what his
rights are. In addition to the caption and a designation of the defendants to whom directed, the notice must state (1) that the action
is to condemn property; (2) a description of his property; (3) the
interest to be taken; (4) the authority for the taking; (5) the uses
for which taken; and (6) advise the defendant that, within 20 days
after service of the notice, he may serve upon plaintiff's attorney
an answer, and failure to do so constitutes consent to the taking
and to the authority of the court to proceed to hear the action and
to fix the compensation.
Personal service of the notice, in accordance with Rule 4(c),
is required upon any defendant who resides in the United States,
its territories or its possessions and whose address is known. If
personal service can not be secured either because the defendant's
whereabouts can not be ascertained, or, if ascertained, the defendant cannot be personally served, as where he resides in a foreign
country, service of the notice by, publication is authorized. For
the customary affidavit and court order is substituted a certificate of
the plaintiff's attorney based upon a diligent inquiry within the
state in which the complaint is filed. Publication is once a week for
not less than three successive weeks. Under the federal decisions,
this requirement is met by publication in only three issues. Prior
to the last publication, plaintiff's attorney must mail a copy of the
notice to any defendant, not personally served, whose place of residence is then known. Proof of publication and mailing is made by
a certificate of plaintiff's attorney, to which is attached a printed
copy of the published notice.
APPEARANCE AND ANSWER

Rule 71A(e) provides for an Answer and Notice of Appearance. No other pleading or motion asserting any additional defense
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or objection is allowed.4 Any defendant who desires to assert any
objection or defense to the taking of his property, must, within 20
days after the service of notice upon him, serve upon plaintiff's
attorney his answer, identifying the property, stating the nature
and extent of his interest, and stating his objections and defenses.
The requirement that all objections and defenses be set up in the
answer with no provision for preliminary motions marks a departure from Rule 12 (e). The general standard of pleading is controlled
by other rules, particularly Rule 8. Instead of an Answer, the defendant may serve a Notice of Appearance, designating the propcrty in which he claims an interest. This entitles him to receive
notice of all proceedings affecting such property. To the defendant
who has neither answered nor appeared is preserved the right to
present evidence at the trial of the issue of just compensation as to
the amount of compensation to which he is entitled, and the right to
share in the award.
TRIAL

The most controversial issue, prior to the adoption of Rule
71A, resolved around the question of the particular tribunal to
award compensation in actions involving the exercise of the power
of eminent domain under the law of the United States. To retain
the board of commissioners set up under the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the special jury in the District of Columbia, and to
provide for any special tribunal which may be established by Congress in the future, it is provided that any tribunal specially constituted by an Act of Congress governing the case for the trial of
the issue of just compensation, shall be used. In all other instances,
the defendant is entitled to the determination of just compensation
by trial by jury on filing a demand therefor within the time allowed for answer, or within such further time as the court may fix,
unless the court in its discretion orders that, because of the character, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for
other reasons in the interest of justice, compensation should be
determined by a commission of three persons appointed by it.5 Such
a commission is endowed with the powers of a master under Rule
53(c). Trial of all issues shall otherwise be by the court.
TITLE AND POSSESSION

Rule 71A does not supersede any of the statutes authorizing
the United States to take title to or possession of the property at
the commencement of the suit, nor does it prescribe the procedure
to be followed when those rights are exercised by the petitioner.
'U. S. v. 76.15 Acres of Land, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Calif., March 7, 1952;
16 Fed. Rules Service 71A-e4, Case 1. Defendant may not file a cross-claim for
breach of lease, against a co-defendant, owner of land involved.
IU. S. v. 3928.09 Acres of Land, U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. S. C., December 22,
1951; 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 71A-h3, Case 1, 12 FRD 127. Court not restricted to
residents of the district in appointing commissioners, and in the condemnation
of lands located in two states, the same persons may be appointed by the court
in each of the districts.
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However, its drafters formulated the other procedure in the light of
the existence of both rights and the practice which had developed in
their exercise. The manner of dismissal prescribed in subdivision
(i) depends upon whether or not the United States has exercised
either of these rights. Again, subdivision (j), dealing with deposits
and distribution, recognizes the permissive use of the declaration
of taking and enjoins the court and attorneys to expedite the distribution of the money deposited in court and the ascertainment
and payment of just compensation.
The Declaration of Taking Act 6 has been characterized as a
supplemental condemnation statute. The United States, in any proceeding instituted by it in any court of the United States outside
the District of Columbia for the acquisition of land or an interest
therein, may file with its petition, or any time prior to judgment,
a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law
to acquire the lands. Upon the filing of the declaration of taking
and the deposit in court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto,
of the estimated just compensation, title vests in the United States,
and the right to just compensation vests in the persons entitled
thereto. The court, upon appropriate application of the parties in
interest, may order all or any part of the money so deposited paid
forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be awarded
in the proceeding. Upon the filing of the declaration of taking, the
court is vested with the power to fix the time within which and the
terms upon which the parties in possession are required to surrender possession to the petitioner.
Without resorting to a declaration of taking, the United States,
in condemnations for a work of river and harbor improvements 7
and in proceedings under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,8 may
take immediate possession of the property upon the filing of the
petition in condemnation. In time of war or the imminence thereof,
a similar provision may be invoked in condemnation of land by the
Secretary of the Army for military purposes. 9
OPERATION OF RULE

There can be little doubt that, as far as the federal courts are
concerned, Rule 71A marks a great improvement over the pre-existing conformity system. However, any critical appraisal of the extent to which it has provided the simple and improved procedure
for condemnation contemplated would be premature at the conclusion of only one year's operation. The rule reflects extensive research and was the net result of prolonged mature consideration, in
which both the legal profession and government officials played
important roles. The Advisory Committee moved slowly and cautiously and reports that it gave more time to this rule than was
required by any other rule. The basic principles and most of the
140 U. S. C. 258 a-e.
133 U. S. C. 594.
'42

U. S. C. 1813(b).

'50 U. S. C. 171.
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specific rules have long been in operation and have been tried and
tested in the judicial fire in various jurisdictions. The minor innovations for the most part represent an attempt to adapt to condemnation procedure the general principles and pervading spirit
already successfully applied in the rules of civil procedure. The
Supreme Court in promulgating Rule 71A makes it applicable to
further proceedings in pending actions except to the extent that,
in the opinion of the court, its application would not be feasible or
would work injustice. The difficulties characteristic of any transition from one procedure to another and of the application of the
modified procedure to pending cases have been present during this
first year. To date there have been very few written opinions construing or applying the rule.

BUREAUCRATS DICTIONARY
A Program-Any assignment that can't be completed by one telephone call.
A Conference-A place where conversation is substituted for the
dreariness of labor and the loneliness of thought.
To Give Someone the Picture-A long, confused and inaccurate
statement to a newcomer.
Co-ordinator-Theguy who has a desk between two expediters.
To Expedite-To confound confusion with commotion.
AMClaifcatiO-To fill in the background with so many de..a.l
that the foreground goes underground.
Channels-The trail left by inter-office memos.
To Activate-To make carbons and add more names to the memo.
To Implement a Program-Hire more people and expand the office.
Under Consideration-Never heard of it.
Under Active Consideration-We're looking in the files for it.
Reorientation-Getting used to working again.
Reliable Source-The guy you just met.
Informed Source-The guy who told the guy you just met.
Unimpeachable Source-The guy who started the rumor in the
first place.
We Are Making a Survey-We need more time to think of an
answer.
Note and Initial-Let's spread the responsibility for this.
Give Us the Benefit of Your Present Thinking-We'll listen to
what you have to say as long as it doesn't interfere with
what we've already decided to do.
Will Advise You in Due Course-If we figure it out, we'll let you
know.
Readers of Dicta are invited to contribute articles, anecdotes
and items of interest.
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SOME PROBLEMS OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE
FRED M. WINNER
Of the Denver Bar

Freeways, limited access highways, super highways, toll roads,
sewage disposal plants, housing authorities and other various and
assorted modern improvements are giving rise to many problems
in the award of severance damage. The answers to these problems
make a very substantial difference to the owners whose property
is to be condemned, and the purpose of this memorandum is simply
to invite attention to some of the existing problems--some of which
have, and some of which have not been before our court.
The statutory authority for the award of severance damage
is found in 3 Colo. Stat. Ann., c. 61, § 17, which provides, in substance, that an owner is entitled to the value of the property taken,
plus any damage to the remainder. Benefits, if any, resulting from
the public improvement may be offset against the damage to the
remainder, but they may not be offset against the value of the
property taken. Nowhere in the statute is there to be found any
exact definition of the elements of damage which may be considered, but the general rule of damage has been said to be that "the
damages to the residue should be equal to the diminution in the
market value of such residue for any purpose to which it may
reasonably be put." Fenlon v. Western Light and Power Co., 74
Colo. 521, 223 P. 48 (1924).1
At the outset, it should be remembered that the choice of the
word "severance" to describe the type of damage which is compensable was advisedly made. For, if a portion of an owner's
property is actually taken, he may be entitled to compensation
for a diminution in the value of his remaining property, even
though his neighbor (no portion of whose property is taken) is
denied recovery. This somewhat incongruous result was explained
by the United States Supreme Court in Campbell v. United States,
266 U. S. 368 (1924), where it was said:
It is only because of the taking of part of his land that
(plaintiff) became entitled to any damages resulting to
the rest. In the absence of a taking, the provision of the
2
5th Amendment giving just compensation does not apply.
The importance of this rule most frequently arises in a situation where the proposed improvement unquestionably benefits the
entire community, but it detracts from the particular neighborhood
in which the improvement is being built. As a horrible example,
assume that the city decides to build a sewage disposal plant in an
area which has been planned and subdivided for expensive homes.
The proposed plant will chop a few feet off the land of A, but it will
come only to the boundary of B's property. Undoubtedly, the value
of each owner's property will be substantially diminished as a result
'To the same effect is United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180 (1911).
-See also, Gilbert v. Greeley R. Co., 13 Colo. 501, 22 P. 814 (1889).
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of the erection of the plant, but A is entitled to the resulting diminution in value of the remainder
of his land, while B is entitled to
3
nothing as severance damage.
This type of damage is sometimes referred to in the cases as
"damage from the proposed use," and the eligibility of A for an
award for this particular damage is discussed in Grizzard v. United
States, 219 U.S., 180 (1911), where it is said:
Whenever there has been an actual physical taking of
a part of a distinct tract of land, the compensation to be
awarded includes not only the market value of that part of
the tract appropriated, but the damage to the remainder
resulting from that taking, embracing, of course, injury
due to the
use to which the part appropriated is to be
4
devoted.
Symbolic of the rule permitting an award of damages resulting
from the proposed use is United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745
(1947), where the War Department constructed a dam on respondent's land and contended that it was liable only for the land- actually taken and not for the diminution in value to the remainder of
the land resulting from the probability that the dam would cause
future erosion. In holding that compensation had to be paid for
all land taken and for all value which would be lost in the future as
a result of the future erosion, the Court said: "If the government
cannot take the acreage it wants without also washing away more,
that more becomes part of the taking."
Frequently cited in opposition to the rule that damages resulting from the proposed use are compensable is Lavelle v. Town
of Julesburg, 49 Colo. 290, 112 P. 774 (1910), a case subject to as
many interpretations as there are parties to the lawsuit. Carefully
read, it is submitted that this portion of the Town of Julesburg case
does nothing more than adopt two general rules: (1) That mere
personal inconvenience is not compensable in eminent domain, and,
(2) that to be compensable, the damage to the remainder must be
special, and must not be a damage shared by the public generally.
In that case, the condemnation suit was brought to acquire land for
a power house, and the case was apparently tried on a theory of
seeking compensation for the inconvenience which would result
from the smoke and vapors rather than on the theory of seeking
compensation for a resulting diminution in value of the remaining
land. The choice of language in the Town of Julesburg case is unfortunate, but the case does not appear to depart from the general
rule that damages caused by the proposed use are compensable.
Whether or not B is entitled to damage on some other theory is not within
the scope of this memorandum.
Among the Colorado cases permitting an award for this type of damage
are Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Cooper, 54 Colo. 402 130 P. 1004
(1913); Denver & S. F. R. Co. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122, 95 P. 343 (1908);
Wassenich v. City and County of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919); and
City and County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929).
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UNITIES REQUIRED FOR ALLOWANCE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE '

A most difficult question, and a question which has not been
squarely before our court, is the question of the unities required to
permit an award of severance damage. Traditionally, the three
essential unities were said to be: (1) unity of ownership; (2)
unity of use; and (3) contiguity of the land.
The cases discussing the required unity of ownership to permit
an award of severance damage are relatively few, and almost without exception they have applied a hyper-technical rule requiring
absolute identity of ownership if severance damage is to be awarded. The results of the application of the rule are often patently
unfair, but, unfortunately, the problem is not uncommon in the
trial courts. As an example, assume a ranch property acquired at
several different times over a period of years. The home place was
taken in the husband's name, but, with the growing popularity of
joint tenancies, other properties were acquired jointly by husband
and wife. If the home place is condemned for a reclamation project,
does the difference in formal title prevent an award of severance
damage to the remainder of the ranch? Under the great weight of
authority, it does, 6 and it is suggested that a lawyer consulted concerning a proposed condemnation should first inquire as to the
status of the title and that appropriate conveyances should be made
immediately, especially if the case has not as yet been filed.
Unquestionably, unity of use must be present if an award for
severance damage is to be made. The land taken and the land remaining must have been devoted to the same use if severance damage is to be awarded; and if the land taken was devoted to an entirely different use from that made of the land remaining, no award
for severance can be made.
The perfect illustration of this requirement is Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 31 P. 2d 467 (1934). There, a corner of a
farm had been separately fenced and used as a service station. A
new highway was put through the farm and the service station was
rendered almost Valueless. The California court held that because
of the different uses made of the land taken and the land remaining,
7
no compensation could be allowed for the service station.
'An annotation in 6 A. L. R. 2d 1197, covers many of the cases discussing
this problem.

I Illustrative of the rule is Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 91 N. E.
234 (1910), where one tract was owned by a husband and an adjoining tract
was owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. The court refused
to allow severance damage because, "This cannot be extended to cover lands
owned by different proprietors." See also:
Tillman v. Lewisburg R. Co., 133
Tenn. 554, 182 S. W. 597 (1916); McIntyre v. Board of Doniphan County, 168
Kan. 115, 211 P. 2d 59 (1949); San Benito County v. Copper Mtn. Min. Co.,
7 Cal. App. 2d 82, 45 P. 2d 428 (1935). Perhaps contra are Chicago & E. R. Co.
v. Dresel, 110 Ill. 89 (1884), and Lavelle v. Town of Julesbury, supra.
,In Long Beach v. Stewart, 30 Calif. 2d 763, 185 P. 2d 585 (1947), it was
held that where the property not taken was zoned differently from the property
taken, no severance damage would be allowed In the absence of a showing of a
probability that the zoning of the two tracts could have been made uniform.
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The third of the traditional required unities is that of contiguity of the land, and it is in this sphere that recent opinions have
shown a marked departure from the older rule requiring actual
physical contiguity.8 Loosely stated, the modern rule is that if two
pieces of property are closely integrated in use, the fact that they
are not physically contiguous does not prevent an award of severance damage, and the properties will be regarded as constructively
contiguous for the purpose of the award of severance damage.
In fact, the ocean itself has not troubled the judicial mind in
deciding that two pieces of real estate are constructively contiguous; for, in Baetjer v. United States, 143 F. 2d 391 (1st Cir.,
1944), the court had no hesitancy in saying that the island of Vieques, situate 17 nautical miles southeast of Puerto Rico, was contiguous with Puerto Rico for the purpose of awarding severance
damage. There, the government seized Vieques which had been
used to grow sugar cane milled in Puerto Rico, and the court held
that the diminution in value of the Puerto Rican mill caused by the
taking of Vieques was compensable in the condemnation suit as
severance damage.
The doctrine of constructive contiguity is most important in
Colorado with our widespread ranching operations; and, although
our court has not discussed the point at length, 9 the Tenth Circuit
clearly recognized and applied the doctrine to a farm operation in
Grand River Authority v. Thompson, 118 F. 2d 242 (1941). Under
the modern rule, it seems that severance damage can be awarded
for damage to integrated, but non-contiguous ranch property. Certainly, the question will be squarely presented to our court in the
not too distant future.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing comments is
evident. The Colorado law of eminent domain is sufficiently undeveloped that a lawyer can safely advise a client that there
are two (or more) lines of authority and that he has a fighting
chance. With the passage of time and the arrival of clients possessed of a competitive spirit and means with which to compete,
the many undetermined questions in eminent domain should be determined by further judicial and legislative clarification.
In the meantime, the safest course to pursue is to employ an
expert witness, sufficiently versed in appraisal techniques to compete on even terms with the expert employed by the other side.',
If this safeguard is adopted, there is every reason to believe that
IReference is again made to the annotation in 6 A. L. R. 2d 1197, which
reviews most of the cases.
9There is at least a suggestion of a recognition of the rule of "constructive
contiguity" in that old ambiguous favorite, Lavelle v. Town of Julesburg, supra.
and in Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493 (1926),
the rule is apparently applied. But, see the instruction approved in Board of
Commissioners v. 'Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 184 P. 2d 142 (1947), a case in which
the question of constructive contiguity does not appear to have been raised.
"0See United States v. 257.654 Acres of Land, (T. H.) 72 F. Supp. 903 (1947),
for a case in which an expert successfully changed profits into market value,
much to the confusion of the trial judge.
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the jury will completely disregard the testimony and award either
what they think the property is worth or what they think the condemnor can afford to pay.
A word of advice for the lawyer representing an impecunious
client, unable to enjoy the luxury of submitting a case to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, is that Major Goodman has recently
taken the position that under the authority of Wassenich v. City and
County of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919) at least in Denver, you can appear in a condemnation case without paying your $5
docket fee. So, all that is required to get the best guess of the trial
judge is that the lawyer must have the competitive spirit, and he
does not now have to have $5 to go along with it.

NEW REAL ESTATE STANDARD
At a meeting held on July 15, 1952, the Real Estate Standards
Committee of the Denver Bar Association promulgated Standard
No. 76 relating to inheritance tax liens. Due to recent opinions
of the Colorado Supreme Court, the Committee believed that a
note must be appended to present Standard No. 47. Standard
No. 76 and the Note to Standard No. 47 are set out below and
will be presented to the members of the Colorado Bar Association
for ratification at the 1952 Convention next October.
STANDARD NO. 76
INHERITANCE TAX-LIMITATION OF LIEN

Problem: The record shows that more than 15 years have
elapsed since the date of the death of a decedent owning real estate.
No receipt for payment of Colorado Inheritance Tax or waiver
or release thereof appears of record. Should an attorney, relying
on Section 7, Chapter 145, Session Laws of 1945, render an opinion showing the title free and clear of any lien for Colorado Inheritance Tax accruing as the result of the death of said decedent?
Answer: Yes.
NOTE TO FOLLOW STANDARD NO. 47
In connection with this standard, you are referred to .the
recent Colorado cases of Mitchell v. Espinosa (243 P. 2d 412) and
Johnson v. McLaughlin (242 P. 2d 812), both decided March 17,
1952. These cases concern a severance of mineral rights prior
to a tax sale of land and prior to the issuance of a Treasurer's
Deed thereon, and hold that such mineral rights do not pass by
Treasurer's Deed unless separately assessed and sold.
In each case, the Treasurer's Deed in question was the source
of title of the person in possession of the land, and one of the deeds
had remained of record approximately nineteen years and the
other deed approximately seventeen years. In each instance, the
tax sale and the Treasurer's Deed based thereon did not except
any mineral rights.
The court in its opinions made no reference to the limitation
statute on which real estate Standard No. 47 is based (Sec. 146,
Chap. 40, C.S.A. '35 as amended by Session Laws of 1945, Chap.
101).
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PROPOSED EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
FOR COLORADO
GLENN G. SAUNDERS AND WILLARD S. SNYDER
of the Denver Bat

Colorado legislation in the field of eminent domain is divided
into three main categories: (1) classifications of those who may
exercise the power of eminent domain; (2) procedures for effectuating the exercise of eminent domain powers; and (3) devices for
use by municipalities in financing the cost of projects involving
the use of eminent domain. This article is confined to the second
of the above categories.
Eminent domain procedures should be simple and quick. They
can be, because there are only two issues: (1) the right of the
petitioner to exercise the power of eminent domain; and (2) the
determination of the amount which should justly be paid to the
respondent. Analysis of present legislation would reveal that its
various fragments were apparently designed from time to time to
meet special existing situations, and there is no necessary relationship or correlation between the fragments. Rather than discuss
these fragments, it appears that the most sensible way to approach
this problem is to suggest the legislation which should cover the
field of procedure in eminent domain and then briefly analyze the
suggestions. We believe this to be a sound approach, because the
ultimate objective of the bar association is to create a comprehensive new eminent domain law of which procedural sections would
be a necessary part.
The following sections concerning procedure in eminent domain under Colorado law are proposed for the consideration of the
bar.
Section 1. A petitioner shall commence a proceeding in eminent domain by filing a verified petition as hereinafter prescribed
in the district court of the county in which the property to be taken
or some part thereof is located.
Section 2. A petition in condemnation shall contain the following:
a. A caption as in other civil actions, provided however that
the parties shall be called "petitioner" and "respondent," and
the petition shall be entitled "petition in condemnation."
b. A clear and concise statement of the following:
1. The name of the petitioner.
2. The authority of the petitioner to prosecute the proceedings including a statement of the use to which the
property to be taken is intended to be put by the petitioner.
3. A statement that the compensation to be paid cannot be
agreed upon by the parties interested, or that some one or
more of the respondents is incapable of consenting or cannot be found.
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4. The names of all persons interested as owners or otherwise as appearing of record. Unknown persons, if any,
shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any
interest in the subject matter of this action."
5. An accurate description in such form as will be capable
of being generally understood by those familiar with titles
to property setting forth the interest in the property to be
taken in the proceedings.
6. A prayer asking that the, compensation to be paid for
the interest sought by the petitioner be determined, and
that upon deposit into the registry of the Court of said
amount, the Court enter a decree vesting in the petitioner
title to the interest or interests in the property described
in the petition and for such other relief as may be proper
in the premises.
c. The petition shall be signed as provided by the rules of civil
procedure and shall be verified by the oath of the petitioner
or of someone in behalf of the petitioner.
d. A map of the land or lands sought to be taken shall be
attached to the petition whenever a map will aid understanding
of the description of the land sought to be condemned.
Section 3. Summons shall be issued as provided by the rules
of civil procedure. In every case, except service by publication, the
petition shall be attached to and served with the summons. In
event, of service of prqcess by publication, the publication shall be
once each week for three successive weeks. Except as otherwise
herein provided, service and proof of service of the summons shall
be as provided by the rules of civil procedure.
The summons shall be captioned as in other civil actions, except that it shall be entitled "summons in condemnation," and the
parties will be called "petitioner" and "respondent." It shall contain substantially the following language:
To the above named respondent---- : You are hereby
summoned and required to file with the clerk of the above
mentioned court an answer to the petition in condemnation which is attached hereto and made a part hereof or
make written appearance herein within 20 days after the
service of this summons upon you. If you fail to do so, the
Court will proceed as provided by law to determine the
amount to be paid you and the other respondents herein if
any there be, for the property to be taken hereunder, and
the Court will proceed to cause said property to be conveyed to the petitioner without further notice to you. If
you desire to question the authority of the petitioner to
maintain this action, or if you desire to have the amount
to be paid on account of the taking herein contemplated
determined by a jury, you will make such facts known by
your answer or you will be conclusively presumed to have
waived any right to question petitioner's authority or to
demand a jury trial.
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If service upon you is made outside the state of Colorado or by publication you are required to file your answer
within 30 days after service of this summons upon you or
30 days after the first such publication.
A description of the interests in property to be taken
is as follow s: ----_--------.----..........................------------------------Dated at ------------------------------ , Colorado this
day of --------------,- ...............................------------------Section 4. A lis pendens may be filed in the manner and with
the effect as provided by the rules of civil procedure. The petitioner
shall be liable for all abstracting fees arising as the result of the
filing of such !is pendens which may become a charge against any
other person in the normal course of evidencing such person's title.
Section 5. If any respondent shall question the authority of a
petitioner to exercise the power of eminent domain in any case, he
shall file an answer stating his grounds for questioning such authority in plain succinct language and the issue thus raised shall
be tried before any trial or hearing with respect to compensation
to be paid by petitioner on account of the taking. Within ten days
of receipt of such answer, petitioner may, but shall not be required
to, file a reply to such answer. If any respondent shall desire to
have the compensation to be paid by the petitioner fixed by a jury
he shall so indicate in writing by answer. If any respondent desires
neither to question petitioner's authority nor demand a jury he shall
merely make a written appearance in the action. No other pleading
shall be allowed.
Section 6. All questions regarding compensation shall be determined by commissioners or jury as the case may be. All other
questions shall be determined by the court.
Section 7. If no respondent shall demand a jury trial as provided in this act, the Court shall appoint, as a board of commissioners, three freeholders to determine the compensation to be paid
and shall fix the time and place for the first meeting of such commissioners. The commissioners before entering upon the duties of
their office shall take an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge
their duties as commissioners. Any one of them may administer
oaths to witnesses, issue subpoenas, and compel witnesses to attend
and testify. They shall hear the allegations and proofs of the parties and a record of the proceedings shall be kept; and after viewing
the premises they shall file with the clerk of the court a certificate
setting forth their determination of the compensation to be allowed.
Upon notice to other parties, any party may move for confirmation
of the certificate, and the Court may thereupon confirm the certificate or any part thereof or may set it aside for irregularity or for
error of law in the proceedings before the commissioners, or upon
the ground that the award cannot be sustained by the evidence. If
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the certificate or any part thereof is set aside, the Court shall appoint new commissioners and direct a re-hearing of the whole issue
of compensation or of the part of the award set aside. If the certificate is confirmed, the court shall proceed as hereinafter set forth.
The commissioners shall be allowed reasonable compensation for
their services, the amount of which shall be fixed by the Court.
Section 8. After the filing of the petition in condemnation, a
motion may be filed requesting the right of possession during the
pendency of the action, or the pendency of appellate proceedings
respecting the action. In event the motion is filed prior to verdict
or finding of value by commissioners, it shall be supported by the
affidavit of a qualified appraiser as to the value of the interest to
be taken and as to the value of one year's rental of such interest.
If the motion is filed thereafter, it shall be supported by the affidavit
of a qualified appraiser as to the value of one year's rental of such
interest. When a respondent shall have entered his appearance in
the proceeding, either personally or by his attorney, said respondent
or his attorney shall be served, unless previously served as hereinafter provided, with the motion, affidavit and notice of hearing at
least 48 hours before the time of hearing. Respondents who are not
in default and who have entered no appearance shall be served
either at the time of the service of the summons or thereafter with
the motion, affidavit and notice of hearing at least one week before
the time of the hearing, such service to be made as provided by the
rules of civil procedure for the service of summons. Respondents,
if any, who are being or have been served with the summons by
publication, and who have not entered an appearance in the proceeding, need not be given any notice of the hearing for immediate
possession provided that an order of the Court authorizing such
service by publication shall have been entered prior to the time of
the hearing. If there is pending and undetermined a pleading questioning the right of the petitioner to maintain the whole or any
part of the eminent domain proceedings, a date for the hearing on
immediate possession may be set but the question of the right to
maintain the action shall first be determined.
Section 9. Upon the hearing of the motion for immediate possession, the Court may forthwith enter an order for such possession
upon the payment into the registry of the court for the protection
of the respondent or respondents of: (a) an amount equal to the
appraised value of the interest to be taken if determined prior to
verdict or appraisement by commissioners, or the amount of the
verdict or appraisement if known, which amount shall be held in
the registry of the court pending the final determination of the
proceedings; and (b) an amount equal to one year's rental value of
the property to be taken for the immediate use of the respondent
or respondents to be paid them, if more than one, as may appear
equitable to the court. If possession shall have been taken prior to
the verdict of the jury or award by the commissioners and if the
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petitioner desires to maintain such possession during appellate
proceedings, the amount deposited in the registry of the court, on
account of the appraised value shall be increased or diminished so
as to equal the amount of the verdict or award. Whenever it shall
appear to the court that the amount finally determined to be due the
respondent or respondents will not be payable within the period
for which rental shall have been allowed, whether such delay shall
occur in the trial court or due to review proceedings, the trial court
shall have and retain jurisdiction and shall exercise it to provide,
by appropriate order or other process, so that the respondent or
respondents shall be paid sufficient amounts, from time to time, as
will be equal to the rental value of the property to be taken, provided that at no time shall more than one year's advance rental
value be required to be deposited for or paid to respondent or
respondents.
Section 10. If the Court shall not be satisfied on the affidavit
or other proof offered to him by petitioner or respondent or respondents as to the amount which should be paid into the registry of the
court for any of the purposes above mentioned, the Court may apDoint some qualified person to investigate and report promptly to
the Court as the Court's witness under oath regarding such matters. The fee of such witness shall be such reasonable amount as
the Court shall fix and shall be paid by the petitioner as a part of
the cost of the suit.
Section 11. The compensation to be paid on account of any
taking in eminent domain shall include payment for the value of the
interest in property taken, the damages if any to the interest of the
respondent or respondents in that part of the whole property not included in the taking, and as an offset to such damage, the benefit if
any to the interest of the respondent or the respondents in that part
of the whole property not taken, each of said three items being in
every case itemized in the verdict of the jury or certificate of the
board of commissioners unless the whole property be taken.
Section 12. Inspection of the property which is the subject of
any eminent domain proceeding by any person or persons connected
with the proceedings as witness, commissioner, juror, or judge may
be made at any reasonable time, and in case of failure of the parties
to agree, the judge may make an appropriate order or orders respecting such inspection.
Section 13. Every value shall be fixed as of the time of its determination, and successive hearings on value may be held if necessary so that at the time of final taking the amount received by the
respondent or respondents shall be the exact and true value of the
property interest of which respondent or respondents will be deprived by the proceeding as near as may be.
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Section 14. Any jury to determine the compensation to be paid
shall consist entirely of freeholders and shall be a jury of six or
twelve as designated by the respondent or respondents in any answer filed in such proceedings. In the absence of any designation
as to number, a jury of six shall be used. Jurors shall be selected
in the manner customary in civil actions.
Section 15. When the compensation to be paid by the petitioner shall have been finally determined, the petitioner shall pay
such amount into the registry of the court within five days of such
final determination and shall thereupon be entitled to a decree as
hereinafter set forth, provided that the amount so to be paid into
the registry of the court shall be diminished by the amount of any
unearned rental previously paid to the respondent or respondents
on account of immediate possession having been taken by the petitioner; provided further that if petitioner has not and does not
take possession, he shall not be obligated to make such payment in
case he shall elect to undertake appellate proceedings or dismiss the
proceedings in the district court within said five days.
Section 16. The final decree in eminent domain proceedings
shall recite the description of the interest in property taken and
the name of the petitioner for whose benefit the decree is entered
and the names of all the respondents. It shall also recite the payment into the registry of the court of the amount of money entitling
the petitioner to the issuance of a final decree, and when issued and
recorded in the office of the clerk and recorder of the county or
counties where the property so taken is located, the final decree
shall act and be a conveyance of the interest so described to the
petitioner so named effective as of the date of such recording.
Section 17. The courts shall give eminent domain proceedings
under this act preference over all other civil actions except injunction and workmen's compensation suits in the matter of setting
same for hearing or trial and in hearing the same to the end that
all such actions shall be quickly determined.
It is contemplated that the general sections of any eminent
domain law will provide as a matter of substantive law for those in
whom the power of eminent domain is vested and that their determination of the necessity for the taking will be conclusive upon
the court in the absence of fraud, malice, oppression or the like. It
is also assumed that any interest in property real or personal and
in the entirety or in part may be taken. The present statute contemplates a fee simple title which would apply only to real estate
and which overlooks that in many cases only an easement is required. The present statute fails to contemplate that war time conditions may create shortages of personal properties which are absolutely needed by public utilities such as radio equipment, automobiles, pipe, wire and the like, and it is doubtful whether such prop-

DICTA

Sept., 1952

erty could be reached under the present procedures. Yet such personal properties are absolutely essential to the continuation of our
functioning as an organized community.
It will be noted that we also contemplate that reasonable effort
shall be made to contact the owner of the property and attempt to
secure it by negotiation before any eminent domain proceeding can
be started. We regard the federal practice of a declaration of seizure without the necessity of prior negotiations to be arbitrary and
high-handed. We believe that the federal employees in almost every
case endeavor in good faith to negotiate with property owners before filing such declarations, but there appears no reason why any
government employee or anyone else who has the power of eminent
domain should not be required to make a good faith effort to avoid
litigation as a condition precedent to the right to exercise the strong
power of eminent domain.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 1
NEEDS SUPPORT OF THE BAR
The Colorado Bar Association, acting through its Judiciary
Committee, has had placed on the ballot a constitutional amendment
which deals with the Compensation, Services and Retirement of
Judges.
These are the principle changes advocated by the amendment:
1. Salaries of Judges may be increased or decreased during
their terms of office.
2. A judge may not run for any other elective office, other
than judcial, without first resigning his judicial office.
3. Any judge found to be permanently disabled by reason of
mental or physical infirmities, shall be retired. The Attorney General will initiate the action by motion to the
Supreme Court, and after full investigation the decision
shall be made.
The proposed constitutional amendment No. 1 was drafted by
the Colorado Bar Association Judiciary Committee with the aid
of members of the Supreme Court. It has been approved by the
District Judges' Association and the County Judges' Association.
The changes from the present law are obvious. They are
vitally necessary. Supreme Court Justices who are elected for a
period of ten years find themselves bound to the same salary for
the entire decade. Regardless of economic conditions, the legislature is powerless to increase the salary of an incumbent elective
officer. The same is true, of course, of District and County Judges.
We have the untenable situation now of the most experienced
judges receiving the lowest salaries-it was their misfortune to
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be elected 8 years ago, or 4 years ago. The proposed constitutional
amendment No. 1 will remedy this situation once and for all.
The other changes are equally important, particularly the
retirement feature. When judges are unable to sit there is imposed a great hardship on litigants and attorneys. The docket
becomes more and more cluttered and outside judges are pressed
into service, sometimes at a sacrifice to their own districts or
counties.
It is the firm belief of the Colorado Bar Association Judiciary
Committee that proposed Constitutional Amedment No. 1 is vitally
necessary for the benefit of our judicial system. Therefore, we
earnestly solicit the support of every lawyer in Colorado as an
active partisan in the passage of the proposed Constitutional
Amendment No. 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 1
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State of
Colorado is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 18. Compensation and Services of Judges. Judges of
courts of record shall receive such compensation as may be provided by law, which may be increased or decreased during their
terms of office, and shall also receive such pension or retirement
benefits as may be provided by law. The Supreme Court shall be
open except on Sundays and holidays during customary hours
of court. No judge of the District Court or Supreme Court shall
accept nomination for any public service other than judicial, the
term of which shall begin more than thirty days before the end
of his term of office, without first resigning from his judicial office,
nor shall he engage in the practice of law, nor shall he hold office
in a political party organization. When called upon so to act any
county judge admitted to the practice of law in the State of Colorado may serve as district judge in any district with full authority
therein as the judge of the district wherein he serves.
Article VI shall be and hereby is further amended by the addition of the following Section 31 thereto:
Section 31. Retirement. Any judge of any court now existing
in the State of Colorado, or hereafter created, shall be retired from
office if found permanently disabled, by reason of mental or physical infirmities, from performing the duties of his office. Issues
concerning retirement for disability shall be initiated by motion
of the Attorney General to the Supreme Court for investigation
concerning the permanent disability of such judge, whereupon
said court may appoint a referee who shall have authority to subpoena witnesses and make full investigation and submit his report
thereon to the court. In the event the court shall determine such
judge to be so permanently disabled, he shall be retired with such
pension or retirement benefits as he would have received had he
fully completed his then term of office. Upon such retirement his
office shall be deemed vacant and be filled as provided by law.
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LINCOLN'S ADMONITION'
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well-wisher
to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution never to
violate in the least particular the laws of the country and never
to tolerate their violation.
Let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample
on the blood of his father, and to tear the charter of his own and
his children's liberty. Let reverence for the law be breathed by
every American mother to the lisping babe that prattles on her
lap; let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; let
it be written in primers, spelling books, and in almanacs; let it
be preached from the pulpit; proclaimed from legislative halls,
and enforced in courts of justice. And in short, let it become the
political religion of the nation, and let the old and young, the rich
and the poor, the grave and the gay of all sexes and tongues and
colors and conditions sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars.Abraham Lincoln.

RED CROSS BLOOD BANK
Members of the Bar who forcefully uphold the constitutional
rights of Man in our nation, state and city are generally listed
as the foremost members of the community.
There is another avenue of endeavor in which they should
lead . . . in that now important necessity to supply blood for
the health of the wounded who were fighting in Korea and have
fallen before enemy guns.
The Department of Defense needs 300,000 pints of blood
each month for whole blood transfusions and for the plasma
reserves required for use whenever and wherever the need arises.
This blood is needed for people and must be supplied by people.
When you think of the fact that more than 106,000 Americans
have been killed or wounded in Korea, you must realize that the
blood which has helped to save innumerable lives has been shipped
from blood centers such as those located in Denver.
These blood centers require a steady stream of donations .
your donations. The Red Cross is the collection agency for the
Armed Forces. It also collects blood which you can call for to
aid the members of your family who may be stricken ill or may
be victims of accidents.
Arrangements for a blood donation may be made by contacting your local Red Cross office-In Denver ALpine 0311.
YOUR BLOOD MAY BE THE GIFT OF LIFE FOR SOMEONE YOU KNOW.
I People v. Westrup, 372 I1.

517, 25 N.E. 2d 16, 18.
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THE FUNCTION OF COURTS IN MAINTAINING
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM*
ALBERT C. JACOBS
Chancellor and Professor of Law. University of Deiivr

Constitutional government and individual freedom are the
foundation stones of the American heritage. They are the issues
vitally at stake in the world-wide struggle of prolonged duration
in which we are currently engaged. This conflict involves two opposing and utterly irreconcilable ways of life, two opposing and
utterly irreconcilable ideologies - the one championing and the
other repudiating constitutional government and individual freedom. It is therefore fitting to consider the function of the courts
in maintaining these bulwarks of the American way of life.
I.

MAINTAINING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

Two related problems are presented, the maintenance, first of
constitutional government, and, second, of individual freedom. I
shall consider them in this order.
What, in the first place, is the function of the courts in maintaining constitutional government? The recent historic decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in The Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co., et al., v. Sawyer,' affirming the ruling of Judge Pine,
which directed the return of the steel industry to its owners, dramatically focused the nation's attention on this far-reaching issue.
Constitutional government has been termed "a government of
laws and not of men." In his concurring opinion in United States
v. United Mine Workers of America,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said:
The historic phrase "a government of laws and not of
men" epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society. When John Adams put that phrase into the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging
in rhetorical flourish. He was expressing the aim of those
who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence
and founded the Republic. "A government of laws and not
of men" was the rejection in positive terms of rule by fiat,
whether by the fiat of governmental or private power.
Every act of government may be challenged by an appeal
to law, as finally pronounced by this Court.
Constitutional government, may I add, involves two essential
principles. It must be representative. But representative government is not always constitutional; it may be absolute. To be constitutional government must also be limited. Without such limitations constitutional government cannot exist.
*An address delivered before the Conference of the Tenth Judicial Circuit
in Denver July 18, 1952.
.U. S........S.
C.
(1952).
2330 U. S. 258, 307 (1947).
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At a time when totalitarianism dominates wide areas of the
world, the maintenance of constitutional government is of fundamental importance.
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
You are all familiar with the actions of our Founding Fathers
in establishing constitutional government in the newly born republic. "They were setting up," in the words of Charles P. Curtis,
Jr.,- "a new government to be endowed by the thirteen states and
their people with a number of designated and limited powers, naming them and stating explicitly that all not named were retained by
the states and the pepole. What is more," Mr. Curtis continues,
the first eight amendments added a Bill of Rights which
forbade the new government to do certain things. It had a
floor, below which the powers retained by the states were
not to be disturbed. It had a ceiling, above which the essential and inalienable rights of individuals were not to be
infringed. Then, too .... the new government was divided
vertically into three departments, Congress, who were to
make all the new laws, the President, who was to execute
them, and the Court, who were to fit the new laws into that
great body of law and apply them by the process of litigation to the hard particular case.
The intent of our Constitutional Fathers is well expressed by
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his famous dissent in Myers v. United
Stats

4

The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted
by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose
was, not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
And Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his concurring opinion in
the steel case :f
A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times
feels the lack of power to act with complete, all-embracing,
swiftly moving authority. No doubt a government with
distributed authority, subject to be challenged in the
courts of law, at least long enough to consider and adjudicate the challenge, labors under restrictions from which
other governments are free. It has not been our tradition
to envy such governments. In any event our government
was designed to have such restrictions. The price was
deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these
restrictions afford.
Such then, in broad strokes, was the constitutional government created by our Founding Fathers - a federal government
LioNs UNDER THE THRONE, p. 9

'272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926).
Supra, n. 1.

(1947).
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endowed by the several states with delegated powers, in which, as
every school boy knows, the tripartite division of governmental
power was guaranteed by an elaborate system of checks and balances. To understand the whys and the wherefores, one need but
refer to the "continuous controversy over the royal prerogative in
England of the seventeenth century."
In this connection I quote from the lucid statement in the brief
for the plaintiff steel companies in the recent case before the Supreme Court, p. 30:
The present claim of the Executive to an inherent
right to do whatever he considers necessary for what he
views as the common good-without consulting the legislature and without any authority under law - is not a new
claim. It is precisely that which was made more than three
centuries ago by James I of England when he claimed for
himself the right to make law by proclamation and asserted that it was treason to maintain that the King was under
the law. It is precisely the claim for which Charles I lost
his life and James II his throne. Most importantly, it is
precisely the claim for which George III lost his American
colonies. In short, it was the continued effort of the English Crown to exercise unfettered prerogative that culminated in the War of Independence and the establishment of
the United States under the form of government provided
in the Constitution.
It was, you will recall, the passage of the English Bill of Rights
in 1688 that established finally that the Crown was under the law.
Preceding the American Revolution the colonists had their own
struggle with George III and his ministers. During this struggle
they "appealed constantly to their fundamental rights as Englishmen which had been bestowed by Magna Carta and the English Bill
of Rights."
To quote again from the plaintiffs' brief in the Supreme Court,
p. 37:
It was against this background that the Founding
Fathers drafted our Constitution. The constitutional debates, . . . reveal with graphic clarity that the delegates
had firmly in mind the recent excesses of the English
Crown against the Colonies and the long and costly struggle that had been waged by the people of England . . .
before the royal power had been circumscribed and placed
under the law.
The Role of the Judiciary
What then is the function of the courts in maintaining this
constitutional framework? The Constitution gives no clear cut and
definite answer. Article III provides that: "The judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." Original as well as appellate jurisdiction, the latter
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"under such regulations as the Congress shall make" is conferred
upon the Court. And Article VI provides that "This Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and judges
in every state shall be bound thereby." The Fathers of the Constitution did seek to secure the complete independence of the judiciary
the judges could not be removed by the President, nor could their
salaries be diminished by Congress. They did, however, leave unsettled what that eminent authority on the American Constitution,
Viscount Bryce, termed "a joint in the court's armour" - the number of judges on the Supreme Court, a weakness of which we heard
plenty a decade and a half ago. Much is left unsaid in the Constitution concerning the position of the Supreme Court and other tribunals, and perhaps with a nicety of wisdom. Mr. Curtis " observes
that "The Convention left the Court to its own devices." And that
eminent authority, Mr. Justice Holmes said in his dissent in Springer v. PhilippineIslands:7 "The great ordinances of the Constitution
do not establish and divide fields of black and white."
Thus a delicate and a difficult problem was presented. The
words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the
recent steel case are much to the point:
A constitutional democracy like ours is perhaps the
most difficult of man's social arrangements to manage successfully. Our scheme of society is more dependent than
any other form of government on knowledge and wisdom
and self-discipline for the achievement of its aims. For
our democracy implies the reign of reason on the most
extensive scale. The resolution of the function of the
courts has resulted from such "knowledge and wisdom and
self-discipline."
A long-time colleague at Columbia, Professor Herbert Wechsler, has written in his article entitled "Stone and The Constitution" : S
For whatever the importance of the Supreme Court
as the ultimate voice in the ordinary areas of judicial administration, its dominant role inheres in its special position in the American constitutional scheme. Within the
range of contested litigation the court sits not alone to
expound the law that it is within the province of Congress
to change but also, as Chief Justice Stone has put it,to
"determine the boundaries and distribution of power
under a federal constitutional system."
Much has taken place since the drafting of the Constitution.
Let us return to Professor Wechsler's clear statement: 9 "The
special function of the Court in the resolution of constitutional controversies has encountered attack from the beginning, but a cenSLoNs

UNDE:u 'I'LI. THRONE, p.

'277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928).
Coi,. L. Ri:v. 764, 765 (1946).

9Ibid.

13 (1947).
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tury and a half of polemic inspired no uncertainty on the issue in
the mind of Mr. Stone." The late Chief Justice wrote in Law and
Its Administration:10 "A study of the Federal Constitution and the
conditions leading to its enactment" leaves "no reasonable doubt
that the doctrine of Marbury against Madison is legally and historically sound." In that famous case," Chief Justice Marshall
established the duty of the courts to review action of the government and to keep it within constitutional bounds. That great biographer of the early Chief Justice, Albert J. Beveridge, III, has
written that John Marshall thus "set up a landmark in American
history so high that all the future could take bearing from it, so
enduring that all the shocks the nation was to endure could not
overturn it." 12
In 1929 we find Mr. Stone saying: 1: The "history of the judicial function before the adoption of the Constitution, the language
of the Constitution itself in Article VI and the long arm of judicial
decision, leave that question no longer
debatable." On another occa1
sion the late Chief Justice wrote: 4
To have formulated in written language a separation
of governmental powers into state and national with specific limitations upon each, as the supreme law of the land,
and to have denied to the courts the power to apply that
law in the settlement of controversies pending before
them, would have been not only contrary to the experience of the colonies but would have involved the performance of the functions of government in confusion and in
conflicts of authority which would have imperiled the success of the great experiment.
In his article on "The Common Law in the United
States," 1-5 Mr. Stone wrote:
Government of a continent of forty-eight states, each
making and administering its own laws, together with a
central government of limited powers, set over them for
limited purposes, making and administering laws of its
own within the same territory [has been made] practicable and tolerable [only because] its framework has admitted of the solution of the clashing demands of the interests it has created by judicial decision in conformity to
the methods of the common law.
Limitations on Power of Judiciary
But Chief Justice Stone cautioned,1" that the judicial review
"brought to the judicial function a task of peculiar gravity and
"Stone,

LAW AN'D ITS ADMINISTRATION,

p. 135 (1915).

1 Cranch 137 (1803).
12

Beveridge, JOHN MARSHALL, p. 142.

Stone, FIFTY YEARS
L. REV. 248, 260 (1929).
14 Stone, LAW AND ITS
13

WORK OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT, 8

ADMINISTRATION, pp. 137-138 (1915).
15 Stone, THE COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 50 HARV. L. REV.

' Id. at 21.

0I.

22 (1936).
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delicacy." Recall the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the recent

steel case:

17

The framers . . . did not make the judiciary the overseer of government.... Religious adherence to the narrow
scope of the judicial function is especially demanded in
controversies that arouse appeals to the Constitution. The
attitude with which this Court must approach its duty
when confronted with such issues is precisely the opposite
of that normally manifested by the general public.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter continued:
The path of duty for this court ... lies in the opposite
direction. Due regard for the implications of the distribution of powers in our Constitution and for the nature of
the judicial process as the ultimate authority in interpreting the Constitution, has not only confined the Court
within the narrow domain of appropriate adjudication....
A basic rule is the duty of the Court not to pass on a constitutional issue at all, however narrowly it may be confined, if the case may, as a matter of intellectual honesty,
be decided without even considering delicate problems of
power under the Constitution. It ought to be, but apparently is not a matter of common understanding that
clashes between different branches of the government
should be avoided if a legal ground of less explosive potentinlit ,s ic pnrnrly available. Constitutional adjudications
are apt by exposing differences to exacerbate them.
Our judicial system thus exercises a tremendous power and
responsibility in maintaining our constitutional government. And
thank God it does! The recent exercise of this power in the steel
case is lasting proof thereof. The nation eagerly awaited its decision; it respectfully followed its mandate. It will long stand as a
landmark of constitutional government. The Executive, in an
hour of great crisis and with the welfare of the nation at heart,
was prevented from seizing the steel industry, from establishing a
precedent that would permit further and greater invasions of individual freedom. The President had based his action on the war
powers declaring that an "emergency" existed and that he was the
"steward" of the general welfare. Recall the words of Mr. Justice
Douglas in this case: "All executive power - from the reign of
ancient kings to the rule of modern dictators - has the outward
appearance of efficiency." And Mr. Justice Jackson reminded us
that:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men
have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. Such
institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the
duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.
Supra, n. 1.
S
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in the steel case: "The judiciary
may, as this case proves, have to intervene in determining where
authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme of
government. But in doing so we should be wary and humble. Such
is the teaching of this Court's role in the history of the country."
But how has the Court attained this high stature? Mr. Curtis
explains it thus: 18 "The clue to the court's power lies partly in the
need that the job be done, and partly in the way the Court has done
the job." And Chief Justice Stone in his dissent in United States v.
Butler,19 pointed out two guiding principles of decision:
One is that the courts are concerned only with the
power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other
is that, while unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of the government is
subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For
the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal
lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the processes
of democratic government.
Mr. Curtis has pointed out, 20 that
Time after time, dozens of times, Congress bowed its
belief that a measure was constitutional before the Court's
belief that it was not, and forsook what it wanted to do
out of respect for the Court's opinion that it should not do
it. The income tax is but one example. The prevention of
child labor is another. Twice Congress proposed to stop it.
Twice the Court said no, once in 1916, again in 1922. Congress was willing to wait until the National Labor Relations Act was held valid in 1937.
Federalism, one of the court's functions, calls for consummate
statesmanship. But nothing explicit is said about federalism in the
Constitution. Rather it is implicit. The powers of the federal government are delegated. All the other powers are reserved by the
Tenth Amendment to the states and to the people. The Court had
to keep the equipoise. The Court threw its weight against the national threat of the New Deal. When the nation was young, it was
the other way about. "It had then to be protected from the powers
of the several states."
The Court has done a splendid job. It handled with "knowledge
and wisdom and self-discipline" the trying problems of the New
Deal. It has recognized that the Constitution is not an immutable
document, that its Framers did not provide for stagnation. The
courts stand today as the greatest power in maintaining constitutional government.

II. MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
I turn now to the function of the courts in maintaining individual liberty. Individual liberty, the freedom and dignity of the
21LIoNs UNDER THE THRONE, p. 46 (1947).
"9297 U. S. 1, 78-79 (1936).
2LIoNs
UNDER THE THRONF, pp.

45-46 (1947).

DICTA

Sept., 1952

individual, underlie the global conflict in which we are engaged. In
this era of severe tension, of crisis and hysteria it is imperative that
they be preserved inviolate; that in seeking security we do not
abandon our precious freedoms. A fairly recent editorial in The
Washington Post wisely said "that course . . . would be burning
(lown the house of the American way of life in order to get at the
rats in it."
May I recall the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson in 1951, in
his lecture entitled "Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law,"
that "the dangers to our liberties ... are those that we create among
ourselves." And may I also bring to your attention the words of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower: "All our freedoms are a single
bundle, all must be secure if any is to be preserved."
Balance Needed Between Law and Freedom
Mr. Justice Jackson in the lecture to which I have referred has
said:
The essence of liberty is the rule of law. Only when
impersonal forces which we know as law are strong
enough to restrain both official action and action by private groups is there real personal liberty. Liberty is not
mere absence of restraint, it is not a spontaneous product
of majority rule, it is not achieved merely by lifting formerly depressed classes to power, it is not the inevitable
by-product of technological advance. Freedom is achieved
only by a complex but just structure of rules of law, impersonally and dispassionately enforced against both rulers and the governed.
And the late Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote: 21 "1 believe in law.
At the same time I believe in freedom. And I know that each of
these things may destroy the other. But I know too that, without
both, neither can long endure." Without constitutional government,
individual liberty cannot exist. The steel case was therefore a magnificent victory for the cause of freedom.
The first ten Amendments to the Constitution contain in substance the legal structure of our liberties. These amendments fall
into two general classes - some tell how the judicial process shall
he managed; others place limitations on the powers of the Congress
or the Executive. These, like the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution, date from the eighteenth century. But their
ideology is still alive here. They must be read in connection with
the fourteenth Amendment.
In regard to the function of the court in maintaining individual liberty, Mr. Curtis 22 has written:
[this] is different and harder and calls for something more
than statesmanship, almost priestcraft. There is certainly
something about it that is either religious in a large measRutledge, A

DECLARATION oF LEGAL FAITH. p.
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6 (1947).

Sept., 1952

DICTA

ure or akin to religion.... We have not only a government
to which some things have been wholly denied. We recognize certain natural inherent rights in man as an individual which we believe no government, municipal, state,
or national, may abridge or infringe. Who is going to see
to it? This is the other job we expect the Court to do.
In these trying days we would, I think all agree with the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson in the lecture to which I have referred:
"I suppose the American people, on whose eternal vigilance liberty
ultimately depends, are all well agreed that what they want of the
courts is that they both preserve liberty and protect security, finding ways to reconcile the two needs so that we do not lose our heritage in defending it." This is their greatest challenge.
No civilized nation has come closer to the ultimate of freedom
for man than the United States. No other nation has achieved a
better balance between liberty and authority. But today constitutional government and individual liberty stand at the cross-roads.
They face serious external and internal challenge.
The danger to individual freedom is from within as well as
without. Fanatical partisans in our midst support our only probable
future enemy. We know too well that these misguided persons
could in strategic places give valuable aid and comfort to the potential enemy. But, as Mr. Justice Jackson has so clearly pointed
out, "probably much greater than their capacity for actual harm is
their capacity to arouse fears and hatreds among us. A secret conspiratorial group, even if not very potent itself, can goad the government into striking blindly and fiercely at all suspects in a manner inconsistent with our normal ideas of liberty." I need merely
to recall the Civil War and World Wars I and II.
Over the years legal controversy has resulted from those
Amendments that primarily are restraints upon the Legislative or
the Executive branches of government. For many years the chief
sources of litigation were the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, applied as limitations on substantive
law. In recent years litigation has succeeded more frequently by
invoking the First Amendment. This amendement is now applied
to prohibit abridgment by states, cities, school boards and local
courts of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion.
Mr. Justice Jackson has written in the lecture already cited:
Whatever the defects of our constitutional system of
legal liberties, however much the generality of their statement permits uncertain applications and varying interpretations, it can hardly be questioned that they have guided
the courts in normal times to a protection of the rights of
the individual against the mass, and the citizen against the
government, that compares favorably with the conditions
of any nation.
But attempts are still being made by the misguided, the unin-
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structed and the perverted upon our liberties. Illustrations would
be superfluous. And we are not living in normal times.
You are all familiar with the decision in Gitlow v. New York, 23
which established that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed some limitations on the states in relation to
assembly or speech. The Court said: 24 "Freedom of speech and of
the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress - are among the fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." In the
words of Mr. Curtis, 2 5 the Court thus extended "its jurisdiction
over personal liberties so that it could reach at will any violation,
not only by Congress, but by any governmental action anywhere
in the United States, by State, City or town, by anyone acting in
an official capacity."
Responsibility of Judiciary
It is the courts upon whom falls the important duty of reconciling the conflicting claims of the States in the enforcement of their
criminal laws and the rights of the individual to liberty under the
law. A delicate and difficult task is imposed. It must be exercised
with "knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline" if individual liberty is to continue. In the recent case of Rochin v. California,26 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said:
The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the
duty of exercising a judgment, within the narrow confines
of judicial power in reviewing State convictions, upon interests of society pushing in opposite directions. . . . To
believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be
avoided by freezing 'due process of law' at some fixed state
of time or thought is to suggest that the most important
aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges ....
To practice the
requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity
no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and
self-criticism, incertitude, that one's own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But
these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial
process. They are precisely the qualities society has a
right to expect from those entrusted with ultimate judicial
power.
Of all the rights protected by the first ten Amendments that
of free speech is most important for guarding our liberties. I shall
not discuss the doctrine of "preferred" and "deferred" rights. Fortunately the courts have been particularly concerned about freedom
of speech and have taken the view as enunciated by Mr. Justice
"268 U. S. 652 (1925).
24Id.
2

at 666.
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE, p. 266 (1947).
.U. S.
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Holmes in Schenck v. United States,27 and in United States v.
Abrams, 28 that there must be a "clear and present danger" of serious harm to the body politic arising from the speech sought to be
prohibited. It is heartening for the prospect of freedom that the
2 "9
Supreme Court has recently declared in Terminiello v. Chicago,
" . . . a function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute." This is in keeping with the tradition of the Court
and its concern for its peacetime prerogatives being assumed by the
executive under the guise of war powers.
Because of the prominence of the Supreme Court we are prone
to forget the significant role of the lower Federal Courts and of the
State tribunals. But it is these courts which set the tone of law
enforcement and of the public view concerning constitutionality
and individual freedom. If our lower courts are intimidated into a
denial of these rights and freedoms, then this protective bulwark
will crumble and tyranny run rampant in our midst. Dictatorship
and statism of some form would surely follow. It is my firm belief
that the courts can, if they act swiftly and firmly when key issues
arise, be the best protection of our fundamental freedoms. There
are those who grant the position of the courts as a bulwark of freedom but nonetheless feel they are not equipped to act in an emergency. I certainly cannot agree with Zechariah Chafee, Jr., when
he writes 3o that "The nine Justices on the Supreme Court can only
lock the door after the Liberty Bell is stolen."
The success of the courts in protecting rights, however, is
largely dependent upon two factors: public opinion and the legal
profession. The particular responsibility of the legal profession in
the service of the courts is too often forgotten. It is perhaps more
than a witticism to say that ours is a government of "lawyers, not
of men." There is the elementary fact that lawyers are officers of
the courts and that both prosecution and defense counsels have
their first responsibility to the supreme law of the land, hence the
Constitution. The highest ethics and the highest courage must be
part of the legal profession operating on this principle, particularly
when the view may be unpopular. Yet fortunately the history of the
profession presents an inspiring record of those who have acted
constantly in accordance with these concepts of freedom and constitutionality.
So long as the courts can and do continue to function in the
manner indicated, so long as they do this with the approbation of
public opinion and the support of the legal profession, we can stop
the menace of statism and in these difficult times of international
tension, prevent the growth of the garrison state. The courts have
a body of magnificent principles for guarding freedom, and these
taken with recent precedents can and must be the bulwark of our
freedom.
-249 U. S. 47 (1919).
250 U. S. 616 (1919).
-337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949).
10Chafee, FREE SPEECH IN
2
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GIVE YOUR SUPPORT
Constitutional Amendment No. 1 will be on the ballot at the
November general election. The provisions of this amendment are
non-controversial and its passage will cure three ills now afflicting
our judicial department. The measure has the support of both
political parties, is endorsed by the District Judges Association
and County Judges Association and is a small but vitally important part of the judicial reform program of the Colorado Bar
Association. We know of no opposition to this measure but
energetic support must be given by every lawyer and lover of good
government to secure an affirmative vote on the amendment and
to overcome the strong tendency of electors to vote against all
constitutional changes. Take time to explain the purposes of this
amendment to every voter whenever and wherever an opportunity
presents itself. The text of Constitutional Amendment No. 1 and
an explanation of its provisions may be found at page 338 of
this issue of Dicta.
PAMPHLETS ARE NOW AVAILABLE
The Colorado Bar Association has reprinted a large quantity
of two pamphlets which have enjoyed tremendous popularity in
the past. These pamphlets entitled "Wills, their importance and
why you should have one" and "Joint Tenancy-is it wise for me?"
were prepared by the Public Relations Committee of the State
Association. Lawyers and banks have mailed tese withthe;monthly statements and have offered them to clients by displays
on counters and waiting room tables with very satisfactory results.
Any desired quantity of these pamphlets will be mailed without
charge to lawyers or to banks able to make a proper distribution
of them. The name of any bank distributing these pamphlets will
be imprinted upon them for a slight charge. Requests for quantities or samples should be sent to the Secretary of the Colorado
Bar Association, 702 Midland Savings Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
CHOATE'S PROVING A NEGATIVE
"A vessel insured was prohibited from going north of the
Okhotsh Sea. Within a year, the duration of the policy, she was
burned north of the sea proper, but south of some of the sea's gulfs.
Defendant set up no loss within the policy. On the way to the
court house Choate said to his associates, as they were for plaintiff :
'Why should we prove we were not north of that sea; why not let
them prove we were?' The mate was put on to prove the burning
within the year and state the loss. No cross-examination followed
and the plaintiff rested. The defendant was dumfounded; had no
witnesses ready; expected plaintiff would consume two days in
proving he was within the terms of the policy. The case lasted an
hour and Choate won."-Reed's Conduct of Litigation, 150.

